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National Parliaments in the post-Lisbon European Union: 
Bureaucratization rather than Democratization?1 
Thomas Christiansen, Anna-Lena Högenauer & Christine Neuhold 
 
Abstract 
Much of the discussion about the provisions on national parliaments in the Lisbon Treaty has 
concerned the potential for increasing politicization and parliamentarization of EU politics. 
However, a more immediate change can be expected at the domestic level, as national parliaments 
adapt to make effective use of these new powers. In order to approach this question systematically, 
this article develops a framework for the analysis of the Europeanization of national parliaments 
that starts from the recognition that the Lisbon changes involve an inherent dynamic towards 
increasing transnational interaction among parliaments as well as pressures to rely more on 
technical expertise and administrative support in their internal workings. The processes of 
transnationalization and bureaucratization are considered as key indicators that help us to identify 
different degrees of Europeanization of national parliaments in the EU. As a final step, the article 
develops a typology of national parliaments based on the assumption that the more Europeanised 
parliaments will tend to invest more into their administrative resources and will engage to a greater 
extent with other national parliaments as well as with EU-level actors. The conceptual framework 
developed here is designed to facilitate systematic empirical research into the Europeanization of 
national parliaments. 
 
Key words: European Integration, Europeanization, Bureaucratization, Transnationalization, 
National Parliaments, Lisbon Treaty 
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National Parliaments in the post-Lisbon European Union: 
Bureaucratization rather than Democratization? 
Thomas Christiansen, Anna-Lena Högenauer & Christine Neuhold 
 
Introduction 
Much of the discussion of the Lisbon Treaty has been about its potential to enhance the 
politicization and parliamentarization of European Union (EU) politics, in particular in the wake 
of the expansion of the powers of the European Parliament (EP) and the introduction of elements 
of participatory democracy through the European Citizens Initiative. In the same vein of bringing 
Europe closer to the citizens, the role of national parliaments in EU decision-making has also 
been upgraded: these have acquired new powers to review and object to draft legislative acts, 
building on earlier provisions introduced by the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties as well as on 
the Barroso initiative that followed the failed ratification of the Constitutional Treaty (Kaczynski, 
2011). This gradual expansion of powers has been reflected in the scholarly debate. Following 
accounts of how parliaments were the “victims” of European integration due to a process of “de-
parliamentarization” (Moravcsik, 1995; Norton, 1996; Weber-Panariello, 1995) in the 1990s, 
national parliaments have been portrayed as more active players in the context of EU integration 
after the Treaty of Amsterdam (e.g. Auel and Benz, 2005; O’Brennan and Raunio, 2007), although 
some still raise the question as to whether national parliaments are “losers or late-comers” 
(Maurer and Wessels, 2001) or indeed whether they are “destined for irrelevance” (Raunio, 2010). 
In this context, attempts have also been made to classify national parliaments according to their 
formal-legal powers and to explain variation across the EU with regard to the way in which the 
executive can be held to account (Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Kiiver, 2006). The introduction of 
the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (Benz, 2007; de Ruiter, 2010) and recent reforms through 
treaty change have opened up new areas of research (e.g. Cooper, 2006; Cooper, 2012; Raunio, 
2007; Rothenberger and Vogt, 2007; Kiiver, 2011; Kiiver, 2012).  
Unlike most of these previous contributions, this article focuses not on the influence that national 
parliaments may or may not have at the EU level, but on the reverse: it addresses the question 
whether and how the new opportunities arising from the Lisbon Treaty change the practices and 
procedures of national parliaments. The wider issue here is the possible transformation of 
parliamentary practice in the European Union, and the eventual move towards a – however 
imperfect – multilevel democracy in the European Union. Addressing these questions is an 
empirical challenge (and one that will be addressed in forthcoming publications; see Heffner et al, 
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2014 and Christiansen, Högenauer and Neuhold, 2014), but first of all it requires the development 
of conceptual and analytical frameworks in order to study these potential domestic changes 
systematically. 
With this aim in mind, the present article proposes a conceptual framework designed to identify 
if and how EU level changes impact on the national level. The framework, as developed in the 
subsequent sections of this article, is based on three initial assumptions are derived from our 
preliminary research. First, we start from the recognition that the vertical process of national 
parliaments needing to ‘digest’ and respond to initiatives from ‘Brussels’ is an elementary feature 
of the evolving system. While this vertical dynamic concerning pressures from the EU level is 
evident and immediate, our second assumption concerns the horizontal dynamic which is more of 
an indirect result of the need for parliaments to coordinate their scrutiny activities in order to 
make effective use of the post-Lisbon Early Warning System. This involves a new intensity in the 
networking among national parliaments – one that builds on, but goes beyond, pre-existing inter-
parliamentary cooperation and which includes networking with EU institutions.  
The third assumption goes beyond the existing focus on the (party) political and deliberative 
dynamics by acknowledging in the importance of the administrative dimension. While much of 
what has been done by and through formal institutions has been dominated by the political 
preferences of elected members, political party hierarchies, parliamentary speakers and 
committee chairs, we consider it important to take the potential input of administrators into the 
internal handling of EU affairs and inter-parliamentary cooperation seriously.  
The proposed framework for the analysis of national parliaments in the post-Lisbon EU therefore 
relies on the following key elements: 
- first, a process of Europeanization of national parliaments, indicating the potential changes 
within domestic arrangements, procedures and resource allocations in response to 
developments at the European level; 
- second, a process of transnationalization, being concerned with the potential intensification 
of contacts through transnational networks of policy-makers from national parliaments and 
EU institutions; and 
- third, a process of bureaucratization, resulting from the potential for administrative players 
playing a significantly greater role with respect to the internal handling of EU affairs in 
national parliaments and the development of transnational networks.  
In the following we will fully explicate each of these processes individually and establish possible 
linkages between them. In particular, we advance the argument that the Europeanization 
triggered by the Lisbon Treaty not only has impacts on domestic structures and procedures, but 
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leads, as a corollary, to processes of transnationalization and bureaucratization. This argument is 
based on the observation that the effective use of the new powers pushes national parliaments, on 
the one hand, to cooperate better with each other (transnationalization), and, on the other hand, 
to rely to a greater extent on technical expertise in EU-related matters (bureaucratization). 
Building on this recognition of the linkages between the three processes, the final objective of the 
conceptual development proposed here is to identify the degree to which different national 
parliaments are subject to Europeanization on the basis of the degree of the bureaucratization 
and transnationalization that can be observed in their work. In other words, we argue that the 
more “Europeanised” parliaments tend to invest more into the provision of administrative 
resources for European affairs and engage to a greater extent with their counterparts in other 
member states as well as with EU-level actors.  
This article proceeds in the following section to set the scene by outlining the new provisions on 
national parliaments in the Lisbon Treaty, before then developing in greater detail the conceptual 
framework for the study of national parliaments in the EU. This involves, as a first step, the 
discussion of the three key concepts of Europeanization, transnationalization and 
bureaucratization and their inter-linkages in greater depth, followed by a typology of national 
parliaments in the EU on the basis of the preceding discussion. By way of conclusion, we spell out 
the implications – and the need – for further empirical research in this area, and also highlight the 
significance of such findings in terms of the wider normative debate about European democracy. 
National Parliaments in the Lisbon Treaty 
As a result of concerns about a ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU, the issue of 
national parliaments was included in the Laeken Declaration as one of the key 
priorities to be considered by the Convention on the Future of Europe (European 
Council, 2001). Following the negotiations in both the Convention and the 
subsequent Intergovernmental Conferences, stipulations on enhancing the role 
of national parliaments were first enshrined in the Constitutional Treaty and 
later taken over virtually unchanged into the Lisbon Treaty (Raunio, 2007; 
Kiiver, 2012: 20). 
The new provisions most likely to affect the day-to-day functioning of national parliaments are 
the right of national parliaments to receive all Commission consultation documents, all 
instruments of legislative planning and all draft legislative acts that are sent to the EP and to the 
Council as well as the agendas and minutes of Council meetings (Article 1 and article 2 of Protocol 
on the role of national parliaments), and the mechanism called the “Early Warning System” 
(EWS). Under this mechanism, any chamber of a national parliament may, within eight weeks 
from the date of transmission of a legislative act in the official languages of the Union, send to the 
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Presidents of the EP, the Council and the Commission a reasoned opinion stating why it considers 
that the draft in question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Each national 
parliament has two votes and in the case of bicameral systems, each of the two chambers has one 
vote. Where reasoned opinions on non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity represent at 
least one third of all the votes allocated to national parliaments, the draft must be reviewed (also 
called “yellow card” procedure).
i
 The institution that has put forward the proposal may maintain, 
amend or withdraw the draft and has to justify the decision. If, under the ordinary legislative 
procedure, the reasoned opinions represent at least a simple majority of the votes, the 
Commission has to issue a reasoned opinion if it decides to maintain the proposal (so-called 
“orange card” procedure). In that case, if, by a majority of 55% of the members of the Council or a 
simple majority of the votes cast in the EP, the legislator is of the opinion that the proposal does 
not comply with the principle of subsidiarity, the draft shall be given no further consideration 
(COSAC, 2008: 23-24; Kiiver, 2012 27-31):
ii
 
The powers conferred by the Treaty on national parliaments are narrowly circumscribed in terms 
of a ‘subsidiarity check’ and in part depend on the support of at least one EU institution. 
Nevertheless, national parliaments have obtained for the first time a formal role in EU policy-
making. As the effective use of these powers is expected to require adaptation, we seek to 
understand what impact these reforms will have on the functioning of national parliaments and to 
what extent this will lead to genuine Europeanization.  
Conceptualising the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty Reforms on 
National Parliaments 
The Process of Europeanization  
The concept of Europeanization is a late-comer in European integration research. Until the early 
1990s, the literature largely focused on the bottom-up process of the pooling of sovereignty and 
failed to address the top-down impact of European institutions and policies. This tendency is 
reflected in some of the definitions of Europeanization (cf. Risse et al, 2001). Nevertheless, the 
predominant use of the concept today is either top-down or circular, i.e. that domestic actors 
attempt to influence European policies and institutions that in turn influence domestic actors (cf. 
Börzel, 2002; Radaelli, 2003). In line with the top-down focus of this article, Ladrech’s classical 
definition of Europeanization as “a process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the 
degree the EU political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of 
national politics and policy-making” (1994: 69) will be retained for its clear lines of causality. 
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The existing literature on the Europeanization of national parliaments documents that the role, 
functioning and organization of national parliaments have changed, mostly by focusing on the 
establishment and powers of European Affairs Committees and changing procedures (e.g. Norton, 
1996; Hansen and Scholl, 2002; Dimitrakopoulos, 2001; Auel, 2006; Holzhacker, 2007). Sectoral 
committees have received much less attention (Raunio and Wiberg, 2009: 75). While the need to 
look at the role of sectoral committees in EU affairs was recognized over a decade ago (e.g. 
Raunio, 1999: 186) genuine empirical interest in sectoral committees is relatively recent (e.g. 
Raunio and Wiberg, 2009). Another aspect that has been overlook is the adaptation of 
administrative support structures. 
In examining the degree of Europeanization of national parliaments after Lisbon, two questions 
arise: Are all actors equally willing to adapt? And will all actors have the capacity to adapt (in 
equal measure)? The answers to these questions matter, because the new powers acquired by 
national parliaments are ultimately meaningful only to the extent to which they can actually be 
wielded. This is particularly pertinent in the case of the EWS, where the influence of national 
parliaments depends on their ability to reach a certain threshold of votes. What matters is not so 
much the individual capacity of national parliaments to act on EU legislative proposals, but their 
ability to collectively respond through the EWS mechanism. If a significant number of chambers 
are unwilling or unable to be involved in the process, this negatively affects the ability of the 
remaining chambers to issue a yellow or orange card. We therefore need to understand the 
circumstances under which Europeanization of national parliaments is likely to occur. 
In its explanation of the dynamics of domestic adaptation, the Europeanization literature 
generally draws on a mix of institutionalist explanations. The core assumption is that adaptational 
pressures occur if there is ‘misfit’ between European requirements and domestic policies, 
procedures or institutions (Börzel and Risse, 2003). From an actor-centred institutionalist 
perspective, change can be the result of changes in the power balance between domestic actors 
(Auel, 2005). From a sociological institutionalist perspective, regular interaction between actors 
can alter their beliefs and perspectives thereby changing their strategies (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 
2002: 260). 
The literature has interpreted the shift towards executive dominance as a result of European 
integration as an instance of ‘misfit’ (Auel, 2005: 307). The scrutiny activities of national 
parliaments and attempts to mandate national parliaments can be interpreted as an attempt to 
regain influence. The Lisbon Treaty has created new opportunities for participation that can 
contribute toward reducing this misfit. However, they can only be used effectively if national 
parliaments address two challenges: firstly, they have to reorganise their internal procedures and 
resources in a way that allows them to filter a vast amount of highly technical legislation, and, 
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secondly, they have to cooperate with other parliaments on legislation of interest to them in order 
to obtain the required number of votes to issue a yellow or orange card under the EWS. Until 
such an adaptation has taken place, a gap between what is possible according to the Treaty and 
what is feasible will persist. More concretely, we expect the adaptation to involve both the 
bureaucratization and transnationalization of the work of national parliaments (see following 
sections).  
However, there are a number of intervening factors, mostly related to the domestic context, that 
influence the willingness and ability of a national parliament to change. For example, using 
Hansen and Scholl’s useful distinction between constitutional misfit (e.g. formal scrutiny 
systems), functional misfit (e.g. for speaking parliaments) and cultural misfit (depending on 
adversarial or cooperative cultures) (Hansen and Scholl, 2002: 3-6), one could argue that working 
parliaments can adapt much more easily to the challenge of scrutinising large numbers of 
documents under the EWS than speaking parliaments. 
Some institutionalist interpretations of the Europeanization process suggest convergence, as 
institutions in a shared environment are expected to adopt similar solutions in their quest to 
optimise their processes (Harmsen, 1999: 84). Convergence can also result from the imitation of 
the effective responses of others (Kassim, 2003: 89). Frequent interaction can lead to the 
emergence of similar perceptions among actors (Olsen, 1997: 161). In the case of national 
parliaments, we do indeed expect that all parliaments experience processes of bureaucratization 
and transnationalization as a result of European influences. Similarly, the increased workload is 
likely to give rise to a greater involvement of sectoral committees, replacing the past ‘monopoly’ 
of European Affairs Committees (EACs) over EU affairs. In the Netherlands and the Czech 
Republic, for example, specialized committees are starting to assume “responsibility” for EU 
policies that fall into their domain.  
At the same time, both sociological and rational choice institutionalist approaches foresee 
continued divergence. Pre-existing structures and values can lead to different interpretations of 
challenges (March and Olsen, 1984), and different starting points can lead to different cost-
benefit ratios.  
Overall, variation in the adaptation of national parliaments to the Lisbon provisions is likely to 
occur in the extent to which national parliaments bureaucratise and transnationalise their work, 
rather than in the underlying direction of this change. Existing qualitative research has identified a 
host of potential factors, but in the absence of systematic data across a large number of cases – an 
essential research agenda for the future – it is difficult to identify the factors that are truly 
significant for the adaptation of national parliaments to the Lisbon provisions. Based on insights 
from the existing literature on variation and characteristics of national parliaments in EU affair 
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scrutiny (e.g. Raunio, 2009; Damgaard and Jensen, 2005; Laursen, 2005; Kaczynski, 2011) and the 
initial findings of our own research, we advance the following propositions: 
- In line with path-dependency, parliaments that have strong mandating powers are less likely 
to focus their attention on the EWS. For example, the Nordic parliaments can mandate their 
national governments in EU matters, which reduces the misfit between the parliaments’ 
powers in domestic policy-making and their powers in European policy-making and thus the 
incentive to invest in the EWS compared to national parliaments that cannot mandate their 
ministers. We would therefore expect mandating parliaments to prioritise mandating over 
the EWS. By contrast, second chambers, which are often relatively weak even in domestic 
politics, are expected to see the Lisbon changes as an opportunity to carve a role for 
themselves. 
- The extent of the Europeanization of a parliament is expected to depend on its resources. 
Thus, the parliaments of smaller countries with fewer financial resources may not only be at 
a disadvantage due to the EACs size but also due to staff resources. In the case of the latter, 
the financial crisis may provide a further barrier to an increase in resources.  
- Parliaments in countries with majority governments and strong party discipline are expected 
to be less likely to adapt, as the majority party avoids open conflicts with its government. By 
contrast, parliaments in countries with minority governments or low party discipline are 
expected to be particularly active.  
Any given parliament may, of course, be subject to several reinforcing or conflicting factors. 
The next two sub-sections will elaborate on the two key aspects of the Europeanization process: 
bureaucratization and transnationalization. Particular attention will also be paid to how these 
phenomena can be measured, with a view to developing a typology of national parliaments. 
The Process of Transnationalization 
The EWS grants powers not so much to individual parliaments as it does to the collectivity of 
national parliaments in the EU. The system of yellow or orange cards is only activated by the 
‘vote’ of a relevant number of national chambers (Cooper, 2012). Successful adaptation to this 
system therefore requires a transnationalization of parliamentary work, which refers to both a 
strengthening of the horizontal interaction among national parliaments and of the vertical 
interaction between parliaments (collectively and individually) and EU level actors. Such 
interaction is important, if not essential, in order to exchange substantive and procedural 
information, to form an agreed view of the way in which the principle of subsidiarity should be 
understood and applied, and subsequently to coordinate which legislative proposals should be 
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‘targeted’ for review and what mechanisms should be set up in order to exchange information and 
views among the actors involved (cf. Cooper, 2006, 2012). 
To a certain extent, this challenge ties in with long-standing structures for inter-parliamentary 
cooperation that form an important basis for adaptation since the Lisbon Treaty. However, in our 
view, it captures only a part of the wider phenomenon of transnationalization: 
transnationalization needs to capture not only the formal and informal interaction among MPs, 
but also the cooperation that occurs among civil servants, parliamentary officials, legal advisers 
and committee clerks.  
On the political level, formal cooperation involves, as mentioned above, the use of 
institutionalised arenas such as COSAC (Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union 
Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union), IPEX – the information exchange database 
through which documents concerning legislative scrutiny are transmitted (www.ipex.eu) – or the 
conference of parliamentary speakers. COSAC in particular, representing EACs, is a key player 
both for information exchange on scrutiny and for the exchange of best practice. However, 
alongside these formal and institutionalised mechanisms, the importance of informal contacts 
between MPs, often along party-lines, should not be neglected (Miklin and Crum, 2011). 
In addition, our preliminary research has shown that a significant part of interaction among 
national parliaments, and with the European Parliament, is conducted through officials rather 
than elected politicians, and it is considered important that this dimension is part of the 
analytical frame (cf. Högenauer and Neuhold, 2012). The permanent representatives of national 
parliaments in Brussels (NPRs) in particular have arguably been playing a crucial role in 
coordinating national positions since the launch of the EWS, communicating issues raised in one 
member state’s chamber to the members in other member states (Hoegenauer and Neuhold, 
2012). Practically all member states have now an NPR resident in Brussels, with most bi-cameral 
parliaments having one representative for each chamber. A majority of the representatives are 
parliamentary career civil servants and have a comprehensive insight into their respective 
legislative system. The NPRs have their offices in close proximity to each other on the premises of 
the EP – a practical aspect which is both the sign of, and cause for, close cooperation among 
them. One key tool are the so-called ‘Monday morning meetings’ which regularly bring together 
the NPRs in order to exchange information and coordinate their (parliaments’) actions especially 
when it comes to the EWS. This largely informal and administrative channel has so far been more 
significant in terms of transnationalization than the activities of political decision-makers, who 
have shown only a limited willingness to engage with the new system (Kaczynski, 2011: 15).  
Our conception of transnationalization thus goes beyond the traditional idea of inter-
parliamentary cooperation, with its emphasis on formal arenas providing the meeting place for 
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elected politicians. From this starting point, we propose to differentiate between different degrees 
of transnationalization by categorising the activity of national parliaments as being either ‘low’, 
‘medium’ or ‘high’ (see Table 1).  
 
Degree of 
Transnationalisation 
Indicators 
Low 
Occasional and essentially informal contacts with other NPs or 
European actors; dominant focus of the work of the NP on 
mandating the national government 
Medium 
Regular participation in institutionalised contact with other NPs 
and/or European actors through mechanisms such as COSAC, IPEX, 
NPR meetings, attendance of interparliamentary committee meetings; 
provision of information to other NPs and European actors (e.g. 
reasoned opinions on IPEX) 
High 
Intensive and constant level of contacts with other NPs and 
European actors; active provision of information; active cooperation 
with other actors (e.g. active discussion of legislation or a common 
approach, alerting others to legislation and reacting to the 
information provided by others). 
Table 1 The Transnationalisation of National Parliaments after Lisbon 
To a certain extent, assessing the degree of transnationalization of national parliaments can rely 
on the quantitative study of participation in formal interparliamentary meetings, visits to other 
parliaments and visits from foreign actors. Informal contacts can also be quantified, although this 
is likely to be more methodologically challenging and may have to rely on survey methods or 
interviews. However, in addition to this, the approach of parliaments can be studied qualitatively, 
for example by determining whether a parliament merely reacts to proposals from elsewhere, or 
whether (and to what extent) it also initiates such cooperation itself. 
In the empirical research that will need to be done based on this conceptual framework, the 
following developments with regard to the transnationalization of parliamentary work might be 
observed: 
- The adaptation to the EWS may lead to an increased transnationalization of parliamentary 
work and a strengthening of existing institutions of cooperation, such as COSAC or the 
Monday morning meetings of NPRs. 
- For the most active participants in the EWS, this may also lead to more informal 
transnational contacts with a wider range of actors, such as MPs from specialised committees 
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(which now play a greater role in the scrutiny of European legislation) and committee 
officials.  
- A multi-level web of interaction among parliamentary representatives at the EU, the national 
and regional level may emerge. 
However, given the dynamic linkages between all three processes identified at the outset, the 
extent of transnationalization of individual parliaments will also depend on the factors identified 
with respect to the processes of Europeanization and bureaucratization. 
The Process of Bureaucratization 
In the modern, liberal welfare state, parliamentarians cannot make all policy decisions 
themselves. Simple time-limits, lack of technical expertise and other limitations make it obvious 
that elected policy-makers must delegate some of their decision-making authority to assistants, 
administrative officials (Arnold, 1987: 279). Why legislatures would delegate and how they can 
cope with the effects of this process has been extensively studied in the context of the US 
Congress (e.g. Moe, 1990: 223; McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; Gailmard, 2002).
iii
 These studies 
from the US Congress reflect that the delegation of powers to civil servants is “often a concession 
to expertise” and although procedures of retaining administrative control might have been 
carefully designed they are far from perfect (Gailmard and Patty, 2007: 536) 
Our conceptualization of bureaucratization is based on the definition by Morgan and Perry, who 
define national service systems as “mediating institutions that mobilize human resources in the 
service of the affairs of a state.” (Morgan and Perry, 1998; in: Van den Berg, 2011: 413). We expand 
this concept by focusing on human resources that serve not only the state in a narrow sense but 
also include parliaments and do not merely focus on national systems but also on actors that 
work within an increasing transnational arena. The EWS requires national parliaments to 
scrutinise an increased volume of documents within a short period of time and to draw up draft 
opinions. We thus expect those parliaments that wish to use it actively and effectively to increase 
the size and adapt the role of their bureaucracies, and thus mobilise more human resources, in 
order to be able to respond to the challenge. While there is hardly any research on the role and 
the nature of parliamentary administration, linkages can be made to the general literature on 
bureaucracies. From a conceptual angle one can i.a. discern attempts to observe the “effects” of 
Europeanization on national administrations from a comparative perspective - in the vein of 
identifying analytical arrangements that distinguish different administrative systems - and to 
search for possible effects of Europeanization on national executives (i.e. Knill, 2001; Goetz, 2000).  
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Empirical research sheds light on what bureaucrats actually do and how this relates to 
instructions from their political masters.  In this context Page and Jenkins identify three types of 
policy roles for middle-level bureaucrats in the UK:  
- a production role when drawing up policy drafts and documents,  
- a maintenance role in tending to- and managing policies, and  
- a service role in offering knowledge and skills to a particular person or body on a continual 
basis (Page and Jenkins, 2005: 60-75).  
The administrative base of the European Parliament (EP) has until recently been practically 
ignored in the scholarly debate. Neunreither can be seen as a pioneer in this context, giving a 
comprehensive insight into the role that administrative staff play within the EP and providing a 
historical overview from the 1950s until around 2005 (Neunreither, 2006). More recent research 
ranges from the assessment that administrators within the EP can be reduced to mere “paper-
keepers” (Winzen, 2011: 41), to the observation that these are in fact players that can assume a 
steering role in the EU policy-process, i.e. influence the direction that process is taking (Dobbles 
and Neuhold, 2012). Egeberg (et al) (2012) find, when examining the activities of EP staff by way of 
an online survey, that the activities of these actors mainly revolve around expert and sectoral 
concerns. 
As alluded to above, the role of bureaucrats within national parliaments within the European 
system of governance has been largely absent from the scholarly debate. An exception in this 
context is Baron (2012) who stresses that the within the French national assembly the sole access 
route to the parliamentary public service is that of an anonymous exam, the so-called ‘concours’. 
This is seen to guarantee the independence of civil servants vis-à-vis parliamentarians. French 
civil servants have the duty to be neutral in the “Weberian sense” and thus cannot assume 
executive functions (Baron, 2012). Clearly, further research into the actual practice of 
parliamentary bureaucracy across the EU will be needed in order for us to develop a better 
understanding of the way in which national parliaments can handle the new challenges arising 
with Lisbon. 
As discussed in the previous section, not all national parliaments will be equally interested in the 
EWS. However, those that seek to use it effectively are likely to see the following changes: 
- Due to the sheer bulk of EU legislation, the pre-selection of which documents are to be 
submitted to subsidiarity control will be conducted by bureaucratic actors; 
- Parliaments with administrations that have hitherto been subject to strict neutrality rules are 
less likely to delegate tasks to the administration than parliaments with a tradition of 
administrative advice. The role of bureaucrats will thus vary across EU Member States from 
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performing a production-role to a service-role. One might even go as far as assuming that in 
some member states civil servants (will) fulfil a role which could be classified as a ‘steering 
role’. For the EWS this could imply that administrators (pre-)select legislative acts that are to 
be submitted to a subsidiarity check.  
- Now that the Lisbon Treaty is in force, bureaucratic players will cooperate increasingly in 
order to alert other parliaments as regards to those pieces of legislation which give rise to 
subsidiarity concerns within their respective system. 
- As mentioned in the section on Europeanization, smaller or poorer countries may experience 
less bureaucratization due to budgetary constraints.   
Thus, taking into account that national parliaments will experience different degrees of 
Europeanization, the impact on the role of parliamentary bureaucracies can be captured as 
follows: 
 
Degree of 
Bureaucratization 
Indicators: Role of Staff 
Low Procedural advice, organization of meetings 
Medium Service role: offering advice to MPs and committees 
High 
Service and emergent steering role: Devolution of responsibilities 
from MPs/committees to civil servants, e.g. pre-sampling of legislation, 
drafting of opinions/resolutions; role in interparliamentary 
cooperation  
Table 2 The Bureaucratisation of National Parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty 
In order to research these questions within the practical political process, this requires the study 
of the process of European affairs scrutiny within national parliaments. The focus should be on 
what administrators do, i.e. on the identification of their tasks and responsibilities, in order to 
determine the extent to which they facilitate scrutiny. When studying the transnational 
cooperation of administrative players across Member States, the emphasis would need to be on 
the tasks of the network of National Parliamentary Representatives in the European Parliament as 
a permanent coordination mechanism in Brussels, but also on the nascent coordination between 
EAC secretaries at the margin of COSAC meetings.  
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Towards a Typology of National Parliaments 
The objective of this article has been to develop a framework for the study of Europeanization of 
national parliaments after Lisbon. In this context, Europeanization was understood as the 
adaptation of national parliaments’ internal arrangements and external contacts in order to make 
effective use of the new system. In particular, the article has addressed two inter-linked questions: 
What kind of parliaments are likely to Europeanize in reaction to Lisbon, to what extent, and how 
does this Europeanization express itself? 
In the previous sections, we have argued that the effective use of the EWS requires national 
parliaments to increase the size and role of their bureaucracies and to engage extensively with 
other national parliaments and European actors. An initial scale for measuring the extent of 
bureaucratization and transnationalization was developed. Once these two dimensions are 
combined, nine types of national parliaments emerge, ranging from national parliaments that 
have a low score on bureaucratization and transnationalization to national parliaments that have 
a high score on both dimensions.   
If bureaucratization and transnationalization are seen as the outcome of Europeanization, then a 
national parliament’s combined score on the two dimensions can be used as a measure of the 
degree of that national parliament’s Europeanization.  Thus, a national parliament that has built 
up an extensive network of contact with other national parliaments and/or European actors and a 
great administrative capacity to deal with EU affairs is highly Europeanized and will be an active 
player in EU affairs scrutiny (“active scrutinizer), where as a national parliament that performs 
average on both dimensions has become somewhat Europeanized. A parliament that has low 
bureaucratic involvement in the scrutiny of EU affairs and that engages little in cross-border 
cooperation is only weakly Europeanized and will most likely perform a limited amount of 
scrutiny (“bystander”).  
                  Bureaucratization 
 
Transnationalisation 
Low Medium High 
Low  “Bystanders”   
Medium     
High   “Active scrutinizer” 
Table 3 Levels of Europeanization (Darker shades indicate higher degrees of Europeanisation) 
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However, it is unlikely that all nine types occur in reality or that cases will be evenly distributed 
across types. Most national parliaments can be expected to have a similar level of development on 
both bureaucratization and transnationalization (low-low, medium-medium, high-high) and thus 
be somewhere on the spectrum between bystander and active scrutinizer. As we have discussed in 
the previous section, transnationalization is linked to some extent to bureaucratization. Before a 
parliament can actively contribute to discussions with other actors, it has to have the capacity to 
scrutinize legislation and develop viewpoints. A certain bureaucratic capacity would thus be a 
requirement for transnationalization. For that reason, we do not expect to find national 
parliaments with a high level of transnationalization and a low level of bureaucratization. We also 
do not expect to find the reverse, low transnationalization coinciding with high 
bureaucratization. One can conceive of two reasons for a low level of transnationalization. Firstly, 
a national parliament may have little interest in EU affairs. In that case, extensive investment in 
bureaucratic capacity is unlikely. Secondly, a national parliament may focus on the domestic 
context of EU affairs, i.e. on mandating the national government. As such a strategy creates a 
power struggle between parliament and government, issues will be very politicized. While 
bureaucratic actors may still be needed to provide expertise, it is unlikely that they would be 
given a high degree of responsibility – i.e. play what we have termed a ‘steering role’. They can be 
expected to perform a service role (provision of advice), which depending on the extent, may 
corresponds to a low or medium level of bureaucratization. 
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Concluding remarks 
Strengthening the role of national parliaments has since Laeken been seen as one of the ways of 
addressing the EU’s fragile democratic legitimacy, and the reforms contained in the Lisbon Treaty 
have provided a number of measures towards this aim. This article has focused on the extent to 
which the organization and work of national parliaments is likely to be affected by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, examining the way in which the performance of national parliaments in making use of 
their new powers will depend on their capacity, both individually and collectively. National 
parliaments need to adapt to the changing opportunity structure post-Lisbon, heralding a trend 
that will see national parliaments undergo processes of Europeanization. The extent of such 
Europeanization will depend on existing working practices, available resources and the party 
political context. 
In looking more closely at the ensuing dynamics, we identified bureaucratization and 
transnationalization as the two processes closely linked to Europeanization: national parliaments 
will confront pressures to build up technical capacity to deal with a larger number of European 
legislative dossiers, and to network more systematically and within limited time-horizons with 
chambers in other member states. Both of these pressures are likely to see at least some if not all 
national parliaments rely to a greater extent on unelected officials who may develop a ‘steering 
role’ in the management of EU-related parliamentary affairs. In that regard, the Europeanization 
of national parliaments leads inevitably back to the question of the effect on the EU’s democratic 
deficit, with the counterintuitive outcome that the Lisbon reforms empower parliamentary 
bureaucrats rather than elected deputies. 
The Europeanization of national parliaments after Lisbon has in recent years become an 
important concern of a number of scholars, though often with a narrow focus on the functioning 
of the EWS (e.g. Kiiver, 2012; De Wilde, 2012: Barrett, 2012: Kaczynski, 2011). However, as we have 
argued here, there is also the need for broader research on the topic such as, for example, the 
work undertaken by the cross-national research project OPAL (Observatory of Parliaments after 
the Lisbon Treaty). As part of this project, different teams are currently assessing the 
bureaucratization (Christiansen et al, 2014) and transnationalization of national parliaments (e.g. 
Heffler et al, 2014).  
Our initial findings point to such a trend of Europeanization leading to a greater 
bureaucratization of national parliaments (c.f. Högenauer and Neuhold, 2012). This 
bureaucratization affects both the internal scrutiny of EU legislative documents and first 
coordination attempts between EAC secretaries. It has thus both a domestic and a transnational 
dimension.  
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The initial impression – yet to be confirmed through more substantive research – here is not 
encouraging from a democratic theory perspective: whereas the involvement of national 
parliaments in EU decision-making was meant to reduce the ‘democratic deficit’ by giving 
national MPs a greater role in European affairs, it may actually lead to the creation of new 
bureaucratic networks and thereby empower administrative actors rather than elected 
representatives. If one takes into account the complexity and the reduced transparency stemming 
from the inclusion of yet another set of institutions in the EU decision-making process, the 
potential of the treaty changes to provide a significant improvement regarding the ‘democratic 
deficit’ appears to be in question. 
Overall, given the limited powers conferred upon national parliaments under the EWS, it is likely, 
at least in the short- to medium-term, that the ‘reverse effect’ of the EWS on the work of national 
parliaments will actually turn out to be stronger than the actual impact that national parliaments 
will have on the scrutiny of European legislative proposals.
iv
 At the same time, it seems from the 
vantage point adopted here that what will be strengthened as a result of these processes is not so 
much the democratization of the EU, but rather the role of bureaucratic networks facilitating the 
cooperation among, and the work within, national parliaments in Europe. 
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i
 In the case of the area of freedom, security and justice (Article 76 TFEU), the threshold is a 
quarter of the votes. 
ii
 Cf.COSAC (2008) for a review of all Treaty changes affecting national parliaments.  
iii
 See also Huber (2000). 
iv
 This is notwithstanding the fact that in mid-2012 a ‘yellow card’ was issued for the first time 
through the EWS system. While the legislative proposal under dispute was withdrawn, the 
Commission claims that this was the result of member state resistance more generally and the 
precise impact of the yellow card remains disputed (Wishart, 13/03/2012, European Voice). 
